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form of a ﬁrst-period contingency fund) ﬁnanced through taxation.
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1“There is an incredible and increasing burden (on African coun-
tries) of aid with diﬀerent conditions and aid that is not predictable...
It is often very diﬃcult for countries who need resources from outside
to be able to plan ... if there is not enough predictability of the ﬂows
of aid.”
Rodrigo de Rato, IMF Managing Director, Cape Town (March 16, 2007).
1 Introduction
Various observers have advocated a large and sustained increase in foreign aid
to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
in low-income countries. The underlying argument is often that, given the
limited ability of many of these countries to raise domestic resources through
taxation, concessional external ﬁnance is essential to support a multi-year
public investment program aimed at developing public capital in infrastruc-
ture, health, and education. In a recent report on Sub-Saharan Africa, for
instance, the World Bank (2005a) called for a doubling of spending on in-
frastructure in the region (from 4.7 percent of GDP in recent years to more
than 9 percent over the next decade), with much of this increase supported
by net inﬂows of concessional resources.1
The unfortunate news, however, is that aid volatility tends to be quite
high and may have in fact increased in recent years. Pallage and Robe (2001),
using data for 63 aid recipients for the period 1969-95, found that aid is ap-
proximately twice as volatile as real output. In the same vein, Bulir and
Hamann (2003), using data covering 72 countries over the period 1975-97,
1See also the report of the Commission for Africa (2005) and Sachs (2005) for a dis-
cussion of the importance of a “Big Push” in public investment for achieving the MDGs.
Agénor (2006) provides a theoretical analysis that highlights the role of improved gover-
nance in the context of a Big Push.
2found that aid ﬂows are signiﬁcantly more volatile than domestic ﬁscal rev-
enues; in addition, the information content of aid commitments in predicting
actual ﬂows is either very small or statistically insigniﬁcant–a result sub-
sequently corroborated by Celasun and Walliser (2008). They also found
much larger prediction errors in program assistancet h a ni np r o j e c ta i d ,a n d
a stronger tendency to over-estimation.2 In subsequent studies, Bulir and
Hamann (2007), as well as Hudson and Mosley (2006), found corroborating
evidence; the volatility of aid continues to be much larger than the volatility
of domestic tax revenues, with coeﬃcients of variation in the range of 40-60
percent of mean aid ﬂows. Both studies also found that aid volatility has
actually increased since the late 1990s, as do the IMF’s Independent Eval-
uation Oﬃce (2007) with respect to aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and Kharas
(2007) for a larger group of aid recipients.
Of course, by their very nature, some types of aid should exhibit a high
degree of volatility, because they are designed to deal with local economic
and social crises. This is certainly the case for emergency aid.3 The World
Bank (2005b, p. 106) for instance found that emergency assistance is more
than three times more volatile than overall Oﬃcial Development Assistance
(ODA) ﬂows. To a lower extent, high volatility may also characterize program
2Program aid (also referred to as budget or “untied” aid) generally takes the form of
a cash disbursement and is perfectly fungible. By contrast, project aid (or “tied” aid)
consists of transfers for investment projects agreed between the donor and the recipient
country; whether it is fungible or not depends on whether, prior to the aid commitment,
the recipient country intended to ﬁnance the project itself.
3Volatility in emergency aid, such as food, can have important macroeconomic impli-
cations because its timing and scale could have a stabilizing eﬀect on the government
budget. When, for instance, the domestic supply of food falls, government revenues may
decline and spending may rise; monetization of food aid in this case can stabilize ﬂows
to the budget, in addition to allowing some degree of consumption smoothing. However,
based on past aid surges, Bulir and Haman (2007) found no evidence that these eﬀects
were signiﬁcant or large.
3assistance, given that it may depend (through conditionality) on short-run
macroeconomic performance and disbursement triggers. By contrast, project
aid should be relatively stable, given that it is designed to promote (directly
or indirectly) investment in physical and human capital.4 A c c o r d i n gt oe s -
timates by the World Bank (2006, p. 93), physical infrastructure accounted
for 32.2 percent of ODA to low-income countries during the period 1990-
92 and 40 percent during 1995-97, whereas education and health amounted
to 8.1 percent and 10.9 percent for the same periods. As a proportion of
domestic investment, project aid has also increased dramatically since the
1960s for many poor countries. Thus, in addition to complicating short-run
macroeconomic management, volatility in that category of aid could be very
detrimental to long-term economic and social development in these countries.
But here again the news are not good. In a study of disaggregated
aid inﬂows to 66 low-income recipients over the period 1973-2002, Fielding
and Mavrotas (2005) found that project aid (particularly in the more open
economies) tends also to be quite volatile. Moreover, aid does not seem to
operate as an “insurance mechanism” against adverse economic shocks; by
and large, as documented by Pallage and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann
(2003, 2007), it tends to behave procyclically, thereby exacerbating the im-
pact of these shocks. If the reasons for aid volatility are beyond the control
of recipient countries, understanding its implications and designing ways to
cope with it become primary policy concerns.
A key implication of lack of predictability in aid disbursements (partic-
ularly of project aid) is that it makes it diﬃcult for recipient governments
4If donor countries provide aid for ﬁnancing large and “lumpy” projects, some degree
of aid volatility should naturally be expected. Our contention, however, is that the recent
increase in volatility of aid ﬂows has been associated with an across-the-board increase in
uncertainty associated with the availability of foreign assistance.
4to formulate medium-term spending plans to spur growth and achieve the
MDGs. If aid ﬁnances a large fraction of infrastructure investment, as is
often the case in low-income countries, and if creating public capital requires
time (as a result of a “time to build” assumption, for instance), an aid short-
fall could bring the process to a halt if no alternative sources of ﬁnancing
are available. In addition, in response to high volatility, countries may opt
to reduce the desired level of investment, which, ceteris paribus,m e a n sl o w e r
funding requirements; donors, seeing lower requirements, may misinterpret it
as a signal of absorption problems, and eﬀectively reduce aid commitments–
making the initial concerns about lower assistance self-fulﬁlling and possibly
contributing to the perpetuation of a stagnation equilibrium, or more broadly
speaking a poverty trap. Aid volatility may therefore have permanent costs
in terms of lost output and exert potentially large eﬀe c t so ng r o w t ha n d
welfare.
Despite the importance of these potential eﬀects, there has been relatively
limited research on the consequences of aid volatility.5 Among available em-
pirical studies, Lensink and Morrissey (2000), Markandya, Ponczek, and Yi
(2006), and Neanidis and Varvarigos (2007) have all found that aid volatility
(particularly with respect to program aid) has a signiﬁcant negative impact
on growth. This eﬀect appears to be robust across country groups, regression
speciﬁcations, and estimation techniques. More directly relevant to the issue
addressed in this paper, Hudson and Mosley (2008) found that aid volatility
tends to reduce both government expenditure and aggregate investment–
5Much recent research has focused on the general issue of volatility and growth; see,
for instance, Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003), Aghion et al. (2005), Blackburn
and Pelloni (2004), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), Chong and Gradstein (2006), Geert,
Harvey, and Lundblad (2006), Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005), Norrbin and Yigit
(2005), and Imbs (2007), for some recent contributions. However, none of these studies
addresses the more speciﬁc issues related to the volality of aid.
5particularly so when considering sudden declines or shortfalls in aid. At the
analytical level, most of the research has focused on the impact of the level
of aid and its implications for growth. Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky
(2003), and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005, 2007), for instance, analyze the
impact of aid tied to public investment in infrastructure on private capital
formation and growth, and so do Agénor and Yilmaz (2008) in a model with
endogenous relative prices. Studies that examine speciﬁcally the volatility
of aid, such as Arellano, Bulir, Lane, and Lipschitz (2009), and Pallage,
Robe, and Bérubé (2006), tend to focus on the implications of such volatil-
ity for consumption smoothing. In doing so, however, they tend to neglect
longer-term, supply-side eﬀects, namely, the fact that aid volatility may af-
fect governments’ ability to ﬁnance public investment programs and spur
private capital accumulation and production–ﬂuctuations in which may in
turn generate large movements in consumption and sizable welfare eﬀects.
This paper takes a step forward by studying the impact of aid volatility on
production and welfare. We do so in a two-period model where risk-neutral
agents must choose between a traditional and modern technologies. In ad-
dition, a “time to build” assumption requires public expenditure in both
periods for the modern technology to be adopted. Although aid disburse-
ments are known with certainty in the ﬁrst period, they are uncertain in the
second. Section II considers the benchmark case where domestic taxation
is absent and shows how a poverty (or low output) trap induced by high
aid volatility can emerge. Section III extends the analysis to account for the
possibility of self insurance, through a ﬁrst-period contingency fund. Reserve
accumulation has indeed been advocated by various observers (including the
International Monetary Fund (2007)) as a way to mitigate adverse eﬀects of
sharp ﬂuctuations in foreign assistance on government spending programs.
6We show, however, that if future aid is dependent on the size of the con-
tingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard eﬀect), the optimal policy may
entail no self insurance. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c F r a m e w o r k
We consider a two-period economy with population constant at ¯ L and risk-
neutral agents. Each agent supplies up to one unit of labor. Production of
a single good can take place under two alternative technologies: a “tradi-
tional” technology, which involves only labor, and a more productive “mod-
ern” technology, which requires not only labor but also government services
(infrastructure, for short) provided in both periods. There is no private phys-
ical capital and there is no opportunity to borrow on international ﬁnancial
markets.
The representative agent’s discounted present value utility is given by




where Ch is consumption, Lh labor supply (both in period h =1 ,2), ν ∈
(0,1),a n dβ>0 is a subjective discount rate. For simplicity, the instanta-
neous utility function is taken to be linear in both arguments.
In the ﬁrst period, the economy uses the traditional technology only; in
the second, whether the traditional or the modern technology is used depends
on expected proﬁts. Because of the low level of income, we assume initially
that the government cannot raise resources domestically; therefore spending
in both periods is ﬁnanced solely by foreign aid.
For simplicity, the traditional production technology is assumed to be
Ricardian. Let Y1 denote output in period 1; thus
Y1 = ¯ L, (2)
7where, for simplicity, the marginal product of labor is set equal to unity.
Output in period 2 can be produced with either the modern or the tra-
ditional technology. The modern technology requires a labor commitment in
quantity L2–perhaps because time is needed to relocate workers from the
traditional to the modern sector–and a combination of public infrastructure










where G1 (G2) denotes government spending in period 1 (2), b>0 measures
the total productivity of the modern technology, and α,γ ∈ (0,1). The use of
the modern technology also involves a “startup cost” of κ1, which is incurred
in period 1.6
If, instead, the traditional technology is used in period 2, production is
given by
Y2 = ¯ L − L2, (4)
given that the labor commitment L2 is made in period 1.
For the time being, we assume that aid, given by Ai, i =1 ,2, ﬁnances
government spending in both periods. In period 1, there is no uncertainty;
however, second-period aid is uncertain. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
A1 = G1, (5)
A2 = G2 =( 1+ε) ¯ A, (6)
where ¯ A>0 and ε is a random variable with zero mean, so that E(ε)=0 ,
and variance σ2
ε . In what follows, we will assume that ε follows a symmetric
distribution over the interval (−¯ ε,+¯ ε), ¯ ε ≤ 1, and density function f(ε).
6O u ra n a l y s i si sn o ta l t e r e di fκ1 =0 .
8Assuming a constant wage normalized to unity, the optimal labor com-













− (1 + β)κ1 − L2
¾
,
where E is the expectations operator and (1+β)κ1 measures the value of the
startup cost from the perspective of period 2. The solution of this problem









1/(1−γ) ≤ 1. (7)
Using this result, expected private proﬁts (measured from the perspective
of the ﬁrst period) associated with the adoption of the modern technology







where Ω ≡ (1 − α)(1 − γ) < 1.
Because of homogeneity, all agents ¯ L adopt the modern technology, if it
proﬁtable to do so. Using (8), and abstracting from any cost associated with
aid, the expected social surplus of the recipient country is thus given by








− ¯ A. (9)
If the term in brackets is positive, a large enough value of ¯ L will ensure
that V> 0, implying that the modern technology is welfare enhancing. In
turn, for the term in brackets to be positive, the productivity of the modern
7We assume that b and A1 are such that this inequality holds. Recall that each agent
supplies up to one unit of labor. Equation (7) implies an internal solution, where both
t e c h n o l o g i e sa r eu s e di np e r i o d2 .I fL∗
2 > 1, we will observe a corner solution, where all
workers are committed to the modern sector and the second-period wage exceeds unity.
Our analysis can be extended to apply to this case.
9technology, as measured by b, must be high enough, in comparison to the
startup cost κ1, and the discount rate β cannot be too high.
The impact of volatility on the social surplus operates through E(GΩ
2).
The concavity of GΩ
2–which results from the diminishing marginal produc-
tivity of public infrastructure in private production, that is, γ<1–implies
that volatile aid reduces expected private proﬁts as well as the social surplus.
This is a reﬂection of Jensen’s inequality, embodied in the strict concavity of
GΩ
2, as a function of G2.8 In eﬀect, the economy would be better oﬀ getting
the amount of aid ¯ A with certainty than getting the same amount on average,
but with a non-zero variance.
By implication, if b is suﬃciently low and the degree of aid volatility high
enough, private agents may not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to adopt the modern tech-
nology; the economy may be stuck therefore in a stagnation equilibrium, or
more broadly speaking a poverty trap (which we deﬁne as a state of “low”
output, that is, output produced by the traditional technology), with pos-
sibly large welfare losses. This result can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. High aid volatility, by reducing expected private proﬁts
associated with the modern technology and the social surplus, may lead to a
poverty (or low output) trap.
Thus, in this model, a necessary condition for a stagnating equilibrium
8More speciﬁcally, Jensen’s inequality implies here that E(GΩ
2 ) < (EG2)Ω, that is, using
(6), E([(1 + ε) ¯ A]Ω) < ¯ AΩ. Given diminishing returns, an increase in uncertainty (higher
volatility of ε) leads to a worse outcome than ¯ ε =0 . For small support ¯ ε,as e c o n d - o r d e r
Taylor approximation implies that higher aid volatility reduces expected proﬁts. More
generally, the concavity of expected proﬁts implies that for a symmetric distribution of
aid shocks, higher volatility induced by a multiplicative increase in the distribution reduces
the expected surplus associated with the modern technology. That is, magnifying the aid
shock, ε,b yaf a c t o rq to qε,w h e r eq>1, increasing thereby the standard deviation of
t h ea i ds h o c kb yaf a c t o ro fq, can be shown to reduce the expected surplus.
10to emerge (that is, V< 0) is for adoption of the modern technology to be
feasible (or desirable) when aid is at its expected value ¯ A–as can be inferred
from (9)–but not feasible when actual aid ﬂows are too volatile.
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare cost of aid volatility, reporting a simu-
lation of an economy where the aid shock follows a uniform destitution in
the interval (−¯ ε,+¯ ε). We plot the expected surplus, (9), for varying levels
of ¯ ε ∈ (0,1). Panel A corresponds to the case where the productivity is
relatively high, hence public investment is highly productive. In the absence
of aid volatility, public investment yields a surplus that exceeds the public
investment second period cost by about 55 percent. The optimal share of
labor employed in the nontraditional sector is about 0.2. Volatility reduces
the surplus of the non-traditional sector to about 40 percent for ¯ ε =1 .
Panel B corresponds to the case where the productivity of the non tradi-
tion sector is low. For zero volatility, the non-tradition sector yields a surplus
that exceeds the second public investment by about 9 percent. High enough
volatility would terminate the non-traditional sector, eliminating thereby any
surplus (recall that the surplus is zero in the traditional sector). The optimal
share of labor employed in the non-traditional sector is about 0.15, dropping
to zero for high enough volatility. Thus, small changes in productivity have
sizable eﬀects on the expected surplus.
3 Self Insurance and Moral Hazard
We now consider the case where the government self insures by building a
c o n t i n g e n c yf u n di nt h eﬁrst period, in order to alleviate the risk of an aid
shortfall in the second period. For simplicity, we will assume in what follows
that A1 (which is given) is normalized to unity.
11The ﬁrst step is to calculate the optimal value of spending in the second
period for the case, where the realized level of aid is large enough to ensure
that the aid constraint does not bind. This is determined so as to maximize
the diﬀerence between output produced with the modern technology and the














2 is given by (7). The term in brackets represents the diﬀerence
between the beneﬁt from spending aid for productive purposes if it induces
agents to adopt the modern technology, compared to the beneﬁtd e r i v e df r o m














The second step is to determine the resources available to the government
in the ﬁrst and second periods. In the ﬁrst period, as noted earlier, produc-
tion uses the traditional technology. Because agents supply one unit of labor
and the productivity of labor is unity, total income is also unity. With τ1
denoting the period-1 tax rate, tax revenues are in principle given by ¯ Lτ1.
However, suppose also that collecting taxes is subject to costs, which reduce
proceeds (in a nonlinear fashion) by −¯ Lλτ2
1/2. Total resources (or liquid-
ity) that the government can have access to in the second period to ﬁnance






)(1 + β)+( 1+ε) ¯ A. (11)
9We assume that due to administrative lags in the collection of taxes, only ﬁrst-period
taxes and realized second-period aid (rather than A1) can be used to fund second-period
public investment. The main results of our paper do not depend on this assumption.
12Given that the unconstrained, optimal second-period spending is deter-










where the critical value of the shock, εC, is obtained from Γ(τ1,ε C)=G∗
2.I t
follows that the threshold state, εC, depends negatively on the tax rate and
positively on the parameter λ, which characterizes tax collection costs:
εC = εC(τ1;λ),
with ∂εC/∂τ1 < 0 and ∂εC/∂λ > 0.
In the ﬁrst case, ε<ε C, spending is constrained by available resources
and the optimal level cannot be achieved. In the second case, ε>ε C,
spending is unconstrained, because resources exceed the optimal value; if so,
we assume that the “excess” resources, given by Γ(τ1,ε) − G∗
2 = ¯ A(ε − εC),
are consumed.
The expected social surplus may now be written as
























¯ A(ε − εC)
1+β
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T h eo p t i m a lp e r i o d - 1t a xr a t ei st h e r e f o r eg i v e nb y
dV
dτ1


















































This condition can be interpreted as a public ﬁnance intertemporal arbi-
trage characterizing the optimal tax, which in turn determines the optimal
resources held in the contingency fund, and second-period liquidity, Γ.T h e
l e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 3 )i st h eg r o s sc o s to fp u b l i cf u n d s ;r a i s i n go n eu n i to f
net public funds requires higher gross tax revenue of 1/(1 − λτ1).11 The
right-hand side is the expected marginal beneﬁt of liquidity, discounted to
the ﬁrst period. Speciﬁcally, a unit of net public funds increases second-
period liquidity by dΓ/dτ1 =1+β. In states of low aid (ε<ε C), the
extra liquidity would ﬁnance higher second-period infrastructure spending,
dG2/dτ1 = dΓ/dτ1, increasing second-period output by (dY2/dG2)(1 + β).
In terms of the ﬁrst period, extra liquidity would lead to a welfare gain of
dY2/dG2. I fs p e n d i n gi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o di su n c o n s t r a i n e d( ε>ε C), the
extra liquidity will support higher second-period consumption, inducing a
discounted welfare gain of 1 (that is, (1 + β)/(1 + β)). The right-hand side
of (13) is thus the discounted expected welfare gain derived from marginal
second-period liquidity.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2, which relates the marginal pro-
ductivity of government spending (MPG) to the realized aid shock. The bold
curve shown in the ﬁgure depicts max{[∆Y2/∆G2]/(1 + β);1}.F o rε<ε C,
it is the discounted marginal product of public infrastructure; for ε>ε C,
it is the discounted increase of second-period consumption ﬁnanced by mar-
10Note that in solving for the optimal tax rate we take G∗
2 as given, as implied by the
Envelope theorem; a change in G∗
2 w o u l dl e a dt oac h a n g ei nεC, which in turn would have
a negligible eﬀect on the term on the right-hand side of equation (13).
11The wedge 1/(1 − λτ1) − 1=λτ1/(1 − λτ1) measures the cost spent on collecting a
unit of net tax revenue.
14ginal liquidity, (1 + β)/(1 + β)=1 . The bold curve is also the discounted
marginal beneﬁto fﬁrst-period liquidity, that is, the right-hand side of (13).
The optimal ﬁrst-period tax rate equates this expected gain with the gross
cost of public funds, 1/(1 − λτ1). Hence, for a given λ, factors increasing
the expected discounted gain of marginal liquidity (as represented by the
bold curve in the ﬁgure) would increase optimal liquidity, thereby requiring
ah i g h e rt a xr a t e . 12
Another implication of Figure 2 is that, in the limiting case of lump-sum
taxes, the cost of self insurance approaches zero, and the optimal policy is
full insurance–holding liquidity that would allow ﬁnancing G∗
2 even in the
worst state of nature, that is, εC →− ¯ ε when collection costs tend to zero
(λ → 0).13
From condition (13), the following proposition can be established regard-
ing the impact of aid volatility, as measured by an increase in the standard
error of the shock, σε:
Proposition 2. An increase in aid volatility raises the optimal tax rate,
dτ∗
1/dσε > 0.
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix. It stems again
from the application of Jensen’s inequality–in this case now due to the
convexity of the marginal impact of the tax rate on the surplus with respect to
ε (see the Appendix). It would hold therefore for any symmetric distribution
with zero mean.
The impact of volatility on the optimal tax rate is illustrated in Figure
12The sign of dτ1/dλ is, in general, ambiguous. In terms of Figure 2, the change in λ
implies that there is no one-to-one connection between the induced changes in the expected
value of the bold curve and the tax τ1. By implication, the impact of an increase in the
tax collection cost on the critical threshold of the aid shock cannot be established ap r i o r i .
13Indeed, with lump-sum taxation, the gross cost of public ﬁnance is 1, hence the optimal
policy should equate the expected bold curve to 1, implying that εC →− ¯ ε when λ → 0.
153, plotting the marginal cost of public funds as a function of the tax rate
(curve MCP)a n dt h eexpected marginal productivity of public spending in
period 2 (curve E(MPG)), drawn for λ>0 and for given aid volatility,
σε. The upward-sloping MCP corresponds to λ>0 (positive tax collection
costs ) and the ﬂat MCP corresponds to λ =0(lump-sum tax economy).
More costly tax collection makes the MCP curve steeper, reducing thereby
the optimal tax rate. The convexity of curve MPG, which is proved in the
Appendix, implies that higher aid volatility shifts curve E(MPG) upward,
increasing thereby the optimal tax rate (from τ∗
1 to τ∗∗
1 ), and the optimal
precautionary reserves.
Holding volatility of the aid shock ε constant, another result emerges if
there is a “moral hazard” eﬀect associated with building precautionary re-
sources through ﬁrst-period taxation. Rather than modeling donor behavior
explicitly, we address this issue by using a “reduced form” approach. Let
R = ¯ L(τ1 − λτ2
1) denote the total contingency fund built in the ﬁrst period.
Suppose also that the expected value of aid in the second period, ¯ A,i si n -
versely related to the size of the fund, so that, assuming a linear form for
simplicity,
¯ A = ¯ A(R)= ¯ A0(1 − φR),
where ¯ A0 > 0 and φ>0. As discussed in the introduction, this could be
due to the fact that donors, observing the existence of a contingency fund in
the recipient country, choose to reduce their future commitments–perhaps
because an increase in liquidity is perceived as a reﬂection of absorption
capacity problems. If so, the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 3. If the existence of a contingency fund creates a moral
hazard problem, the optimal tax rate is lower than otherwise.
16Graphically, the eﬀect of adding moral hazard is to entail a uniform shift
of the bold curve in Figure 2. The adverse eﬀect of self insurance on expected
aid acts as a tax on the gains of marginal second-period liquidity (the expres-
sion on the right-hand side of (13)), reducing thereby optimal hoarding and
the optimal tax rate. In terms of Figure 2, higher φ shifts the downward-
sloping portion of the bold curve, thereby reducing the expected discounted
gain of marginal second-period liquidity, and thus lowering the optimal tax
rate. This eﬀect reﬂects the moral hazard resulting from the combination of
aid uncertainty and aid responsiveness to holding a contingency fund.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper studied the impact of aid volatility on economic performance
in a simple two-period model with a traditional and modern technologies.
Public spending is productive and “time to build” requires expenditure in
both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a
stagnation equilibrium or poverty trap (deﬁned as a state where second-
period production continues to be carried out with the traditional technology)
induced by high aid volatility is ﬁrst examined in a benchmark case where
taxation is absent. Government spending (whose sole purpose is to provide
productive services) is thus ﬁnanced in its entirety by aid. The analysis is
then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a ﬁrst-period
contingency fund) ﬁnanced through taxation. We showed that an increase
in aid volatility raises the optimal tax rate and that if expected future aid is
dependent on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard
eﬀect), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance.
Despite the fact that they have been derived in a highly stylized setting,
17our results have several broad implications. The ﬁrst is that aid volatility
may not only potentially exacerbate the impact of macroeconomic shocks
(due to its procyclical nature, as demonstrated in some studies), but it may
also contribute to the emergence, or persistence, of a poverty and low-output
trap if aid exerts productive eﬀects–either directly (because donors commit
to certain projects) or through its impact on public spending. In that sense,
the model’s predictions are consistent with the results of Kose, Prasad, and
Terrones (2005, Table 6), which show that volatility in government spend-
ing has an adverse eﬀect on economic growth. The second is that although
an increase in aid volatility may call for an increase in (optimal) tax rates,
in practice these increases may not be feasible, due to various administra-
tive and political constraints. Aid volatility may therefore hamper resource
mobilization. Finally, our results cast doubt on the wisdom of a commonly
suggested policy response to aid volatility–the buildup of a contingency or
buﬀer fund, typically in the form of accumulation of international oﬃcial
reserves (see for instance Eifert and Gelb (2006) and International Mone-
tary Fund (2007)). The very existence of such a fund may lead donors to
change their behavior in terms of future aid commitments–which in turn
would reduce the recipient’s incentives to raise taxes, “save for a rainy day,”
and maintain government spending plans at the desired level to spur growth.
The extent to which these adverse moral hazard eﬀects on individual donor
behavior can be mitigated through greater donor coordination, or a common
external agency, remains a matter for debate.14
14The British proposal for an international ﬁnance facility (see the report of the Com-
mission for Africa (2005)) was an attempt to tackle the issue. However, so far it has
received only limited support by major donors.
18Appendix
Derivation of Proposition 2
With the representative agent’s discounted present value utility given in
(1), the social surplus function can be written as
S =
(
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γ )ΩΓΩ−1¯ L(1 − λτ1)
−¯ L + ¯ L(1 − λτ1)
for ε ≤ εC
for ε>ε C
. (A2)
The ﬁrst-order condition (denoted by F) determining the optimal tax
rate, and thereby also optimal liquidity hoarding, is F = E(dS/dτ1)=0 ;i t







The second-order condition for maximization implies that Fτ1 < 0 (it is
easy to verify that F =0and (10) implies that the second-order condition









γ )Ω(Ω − 1)(Ω − 2) ¯ AΓΩ−2¯ L(1 − λτ1) > 0
0




Thus, higher volatility of ε increases dS/dτ1,s ot h a tFσε > 0.C o n s e -
quently, given the sign of Fτ1,w eh a v edτ1/dσε: an increase in aid volatility
raises the optimal tax rate, partially oﬀsetting the eﬀect of such volatility by
“self insurance,” in the form of hoarding liquidity in the ﬁrst period. Equa-
tion (A3) also implies that curve E(MPG) in Figure 3 is weakly convex.
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Figure 1 
Aid Volatility and the Expected Social Surplus 
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Determination of the Optimal Tax Rate 
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      Note: MCP stands for the marginal cost of public funds. The upward-sloping MCP 
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